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TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA

Breakdown of the TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA cipher suite

Cyber Security Rating for TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA - D

B

Key Exchange Mechanism

Diffie Hellman-DH

Static Diffie Hellman (DH) does not use emphemeral (temporary) keys, meaning it violates perfect forward secrecy. Ephemeral Diffie Hellman (EDH) should be used instead.

A

Authentication

Rivest, Shamir, Adleman-RSA

RSA as an authentication mechanism in cipher suites is secure because it relies on the difficulty of factoring large prime numbers. This makes it computationally infeasible for attackers to derive the private key from the public key, ensuring confidentiality and integrity in secure communications.

C

Cipher

Camellia-CAMELLIA

Cryptographic algorithms with low adoption should be avoided due to several critical reasons. They often lack rigorous scrutiny and testing by the broader cryptographic community, which increases the risk of undetected vulnerabilities. Moreover, their limited deployment means fewer opportunities for real-world validation and feedback, hindering confidence in their security and interoperability with existing systems. High adoption indicates robustness from extensive scrutiny and successful implementation in diverse environments.

D

Hash

Secure Hash Algorithm-SHA

Chosen prefix attacks for SHA1 are feasible at an accessible cost to a well-funded adversary. This level of expense, while significant, does not pose a substantial barrier to attackers with sufficient resources, making such attacks a credible threat.

A

Key Size

128 Bit-128

128-bit symmetric encryption keys are considered secure because they provide an astronomically large number of possible combinations (2^128), making brute-force attacks computationally infeasible with current technology. This level of security is sufficient for most practical purposes and is widely adopted in various encryption protocols.

D

Cipher Mode

Cipher Block Chaining-CBC

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is vulnerable to the Lucky13 and POODLE (in TLS v1.2 and below) attacks. The Lucky13 attack exploits timing discrepancies in padding validation, allowing attackers to gradually reveal plaintext. The POODLE attack leverages padding errors to decrypt ciphertext by repeatedly modifying and sending it to the server, observing the error responses. These vulnerabilities arise from CBC's handling of padding and error messages, making it less secure than modern encryption modes like Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), which offer stronger integrity and confidentiality guarantees.

Web infrastructure owners must ensure they only allow secure cipher suites to protect against potential security threats. Cipher suites determine the encryption algorithms and key exchange mechanisms used in HTTPS connections. Insecure cipher suites can leave data vulnerable to interception, decryption, and manipulation by malicious actors. By restricting to secure cipher suites, owners mitigate risks such as data breaches, unauthorized access, and compromise of sensitive information. This proactive measure helps maintain trust with users, ensures compliance with security standards, and safeguards the integrity and confidentiality of data transmitted over the web.
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